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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS SERVICE CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Pla~intiff arn.d Respondent, 
-vs.-
H. A. DANIELSON, 
Defendarn.t a.nd Ap·pellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 9232 
The statement of facts set forth in Appellant's Brief 
is inadequate and in some respects misleading so that 
Respondent desires to restate the facts in respect to the 
matter now before the Court. Because of the designation 
used by Appellant in referring to the parties as Plaintiff 
and Defendant, Respondent (Plaintiff) will follow the 
same procedure. 
Plaintiff Corporation was incorporated in 1955 by 
the Defendant and fourteen other masonry contractors 
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who had decided to form a corporation for the purpose of 
conducting ''a .. servic.e business fdr .·the ·masonry con-
tract~rs; to do prelimin~ry work, farnishing ~stim~tes 
and other information prerequisite of work." {Exh. 1) 
Not only was Defendant one of the original incorporators, 
but he w.as also one of the original Board of Directors, 
and continued to serve in the capacity of a director in 
Plaintiff Corporation until he· allegedly "resigned in the 
Summer of 1958. (Exh. 2, R. 63) 
Immediately after the incorporation, two estimators 
were retained by the Company to furnish information to 
the members regarding materials which would be re-
quired for jobs available for bidding. (Ex. 3) On Jan-
uary 3, 1956, at the second meeting of the Board of Di-
rectors of the Corporation, at which the Defendant was 
present, it was , unanimously . agr-eed that the members 
would pay to the Corporation one per cent (1%) on all 
jobs received by the members up to $10,000.00, two per 
cent (2%) on jobs up to $25,000.00, and three per cent 
(3%) on any job over $25,000.00. (Exh. 3) 
The Defendant also seconded a motion (which was 
likewise unanimously carried), that the fees by the mem-
bers to the corporation ''be pro-rated and paid as the 
progress payments are received on the contract.'' 
(Exh. 3) 
Shortly after this meeting, a. Mr. Gerald Whitaker 
was employed full time by the organization to prepare and 
render the estimating service to the members. His duties 
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included preparing materials, estimates and other data 
on all known building jobs open for bids, and to furnish 
the same to the individual members of the organization. 
Such estimates were important as a basis for determin-
ing what material would be necessary in connection with 
any bid submitted or as a proo£ or check against the fig-
ures compiled by the individual member himself. In addi-
tion to this service, Mr. Whitaker was also required to 
furnish private estimates to any member seeking the 
same, and otherwise to render assistance to individual 
members when called upon to do so in respect to any job 
in which such member was interested. (R. 40) Particu-
larly, Mr. Whitaker testified as to such personalized serv-
ices rendered to D.efendant. (R. 41-42) During the year 
1956, Mr. Whitaker prepared 133 job estimates of which 
approximately 6 were for individual members and the 
balance of 127 were distributed to all of the members, 
including the Defendant herein. (Exh. 4) (R. 44-46) In 
the year 1957, 182 e,stimates were made with approxi-
mately the same number of private estimates, the bal-
ance being sent to the members, including the Defendant 
herein. ( Exh. 5, R. 4 7) 
During this period of time, Defendant obtained not 
less than six jobs and by reason of the agreement en-
tered into with the Plaintiff Corporation became o bli-
gated to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $5,288.00. (Exh. 7) 
Defendant actually paid the specific amount called for by 
the agreement on the first two jobs, (Exh. 2) and made 
additional payments on other jobs for a total payment of 
$1,662.00, leaving a balance owing to the Corporation 
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of $3,626.00 which he had not paid and for which legal 
action was instituted. (Exh. 8) 
There is a dispute in the testimony with respect to 
certain conversations concerning his account. Mr. Whit-
taker testified that Defendant on several occasions ack-
nowledged the obligation in full and made repeated prom-
ises to pay the same. Defendant, on the other hand, 
admitted that certain of these conversations took place, 
but denied that he knew how much was owing or that 
he had agreed to pay the whole amount. (R. 123) 
However, there is one conversation which is not dis-
puted by Defendant and which is actually corroborated 
by Defendant's witness. Mr. Whitaker testified that De-
fendant attended a meeting of the Board of Directors 
held at. Harman's Cafe in October, 1958, at which time 
the President of the Corporation requested Mr. Whit-
aker to advise Defendant of the amount of his bill. The 
witness then did so, which bill included an additional item 
not now claimed. Defendant objected to this item as hav-
ing accrued after he had ''resigned'' and thereupon the 
President instructed the witness to delete such item 
from the bill. As to the balance thereof, Defendant ''said 
he wo.uld pay it, but he \Yanted equal treatment that every-
body else got. ' ' ( R. 63) As to \Y hat took place at Har-
man's Cafe on the occasion referred to by 1\Ir. Whitaker, 
Defendant's witness, Calvin N. Ashton, testified: 
''A. To my recollection the conversation con-
cerned money o\\Ted by Mr. Danielson, the 
specific amount being read to him, ho\v much 
he was owing, and his agreement to pay con-
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ditioned upon the fact that all members owing 
pay all items - the same fee that he had 
been charged.'' ( R. 118) 
The fees charged all members were computed on 
the basis of the fee schedule set up in the minutes of the 
Board (Exh. 3). The members were to report their jobs 
at the monthly meetings which were held. If the member 
reported what he owed, that was accepted unless it ap-
peared to be contrary to the information available. If 
a member failed to report the amount owing, Mr. Whit-
aker had to make the computation himself from the infor-
mation available to him using the same fee schedule, and 
leave it up to the member to question the amount if there 
was a dispute. Mr. Whitaker testified that he had never 
received any objection from the Defendant herein. (R. 
49, 50) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Appellant has listed five points of alleged error in 
connection with the judgment of the lower court. The 
first two points involve the question of whether the evi-
dence is sufficient to sustain a finding that an agreement 
existed between the corporate Plaintiff and the individual 
Defendant. Point III alleges that the Plaintiff breached 
the agreement, if any, between the parties, and therefore 
cannot recover. Point IV sets out an alleged defense that 
the agreement violates the Statute of Frauds. Finally, 
Point V urges that the agreement is in violation of Sec-
tion 50-1-6 U. C. A. 1953, as amended, and is void and 
unenforceable a.s being against public policy in that it is 
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in restraint of. trade. Plaintiff will discuss the first three 
points together and the other individual points separately 
under the following headings : 
I. Sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding 
of the Court as to the obligation of the Defendant. 
II. Is Plaintiff precluded from recovery by reason 
of the provisions of Section 25-5-4, U. C. A. 1953 (com-
monly referred to as the Statute of Frauds) ~ 
III. Is the alleged agreement against public policy 
and in violation of Section 50-1-6, U. C. A. 1953, as 
amended, and therefore void and unenforceable as an 
unlawful restraint of trade~ 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT THE FINDING OF THE COURT AS TO 
THE OBLIGATION OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The graveman of Plaintiff's Complaint against the 
Defendant in this action is set forth in the pre-trial order 
to the effect that ''the Plaintiff sues the Defendant for 
services rendered of the agreed and reasonable value of 
$3,626.00." (R. 8) Although the Plaintiff claims that the 
Defendant agreed to pay a specific sum for the services 
rendered to Defendant by Plaintiff, the Plaintiff never-
theless also seeks to recover on a quantum merut basis. 
The Court determined that there was a contract 'Yhereby 
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Defendant agreed to pay a specific sum for the services 
rendered to him by the Corporation but also found that 
the reasonable value of the services rendered was ''not 
less than $7,000.00." (R. 148, 149) 
In arguing that there was no contract between the 
Plaintiff Corporation and Defendant, Defendant entirely 
overlooks the basic elements of a contract. A contract 
may be expressed by the statements, or implied from the 
conduct and actions of the parties. A good definition of 
express and implied contracts is contained in 12 Am. Jur., 
''CONTRACTS,'' Sect. 4, p. 498, as follows: 
'' 4. ExPRESS AND IMPLIED CoNTRACTs. Con-
tracts are express or implied. Implied contracts 
are implied in fact or in law. Contracts are ex-
press when their terms are stated by the parties. 
They are often said to be implied when their terms 
are not so stated. Contracts implied in fact are 
inferred from the facts and circumstances of the 
case, and are not formally or explicitly stated in 
words. It is often said that the only difference be-
tween an express· contract a.nd a contract implied 
in fact is that in the former the parties arrive at 
their agreement by words, whether oral or written, 
sealed or unsealed, while in the latter, their agree-
ment is arrived a.t by a consideration of their acts 
an.d conduct, a;n.d that in both of these cases there 
is, in fact, a contract existing between the parties, 
the only difference being in the character of evi-
dence necessary to establish it. In other words, in 
an express contract all the terms and conditions 
are expressed between the parties, while in an im-
plied contract, some one or more of the terms and 
conditions are implied from the conduct of the 
parties. The source of the obligation of express 
contracts and contracts implied in fact is the man-
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ifested intention of the parties. An implied con-
tract between two parties is only raised when the 
facts are such that an intent may fairly be inferred 
on their part to make such a contract. All the per-
tinent circumstances must be taken into consid-
eration.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
Section 5 goes on to illustrate : 
''Many illustrations of contracts implied in 
fact may be given. Where a person performs serv-
ices, furnishes property, or expends money for 
another at the other's request and there is no ex-
press agreement as to compensation, a promise 
to pay the reasonable value of the services or prop-
erty or to reimburse for money expended may 
properly be implied where the circumstances war-
rant such an inference, but such a promise cannot 
properly be implied where the circumstances do 
not warrant an inference of such a promise. A 
promise will not be inferred where there are facts 
wholly inconsistent with the contract to be im-
plied. Generally, there is an implication of a 
promise to pay for valuable services rendered with 
the knowledge and approval of the recipient, in 
the absence of a showing to the contrary.'' 
The Restatement on the Law of Contracts, Vol. 1, 
Sec. 5 states : 
''A promise in a contract must be stated in such 
words either oral or \Yritten, or must be inferred 
wholly or partly from such conduct, as justifies 
the promise in understanding that the promisor 
intended to make a promise.'' 
In the comment following, the Restatement adds: 
''Contracts are often spoken of as express or 
implied. The distinction involves, however, no dif-
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ference in legal effect, but lies merely in the mode 
of manifesting assent.'' 
Cases which have discussed the difference between 
express and implied contracts and affirmed the principle 
that the difference lies merely with the manner of proof 
are as follows : 
W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, et al., 40 C. A. 2d 778, 256 P. 
2d 947; Fred K. Caron, v. Parley G. Andrew, 133 C. A. 
2d 412, 284, P. 2d 550. In the latter case the Court made 
the following observation: 
'' 'It is generally held that the existence of an 
implied contract is usually a question of fact for 
the trial court. Where evidence is conflicting or 
where reasonable conflicting inferences may be 
drawn from evidence which is not in conflict, a 
question of fact is presented for decision of the 
trial court. 
* * * ** * 
" 'Further, on appeal we must draw all rea-
sonable inferences in favor of the judgment.' Me-
dina v. Van Camp Sea Food Co., 75 C. A. 2d 551, 
556, 171 p. 2d 445, 448. ' ' 
Likewise, Defendant has failed to recognize the dis-
tinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts. A uni-
lateral contract is defined by the Restatement of Con-
tracts as one "in which no promisor receives a promise as 
consideration for his promise." (Ibid., Vol. 1, Sec. 12) 
In the Comment to this section, the Restatement goes 
on to state: 
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"a. In a unilateral contract the exchange for 
the promise is something other than a promise ; 
in a bilateral contract promises are exchanged for 
one another. 
''b. ·There must always be at least two parties 
to a contract, whether unilateral or bilateral, and 
there must usually be an expression or assent by 
each. In many cases, however, a promise becomes 
a contract even though no return promise is made 
by the promisee. In such cases the legal duty is 
unilateral, resting on the promisor alone. The cor-
relative legal right is also unilateral, being pos-
sessed by the promisee alone. The statement often 
ma.de that unless both parties are bound neither is 
bound is quite erroneous, as a universal state· 
ment." (Emphasis supplied) 
In the instant case, the Court found that one of the 
purposes for which Plaintiff Corporation was formed 
"was to furnish to its members and stockholders material 
analyses or quantity surveys on projects open to bid by 
such members." (R. 148) 
The Court likewise found that ''in consideration of 
the agreement of the corporation to furnish such serv-
ices to him and in consideration of the agreement of the 
other members of the corporation so to do, Defendant 
agreed to pay to the Plaintiff Corporation in cash .... '' 
(R. 148) 
The above findings and all others are adequately sup-
ported by the evidence in this case. In fact, there is no 
dispute with respect to the above items in the record. 
When Defendant was asked by his counsel if he had ever 
10 
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entered into any agreement with the Corporation, he 
answered: 
''Well, I don't know just what you mean by 
that. I was maybe, you might say, one of the orig-
inal incorporators, but no agreement.'' (R. 122) 
When called upon further to explain the matter, he 
said that he did not sign a formal agreement. (R. 122) 
Defendant contends in his brief that the Corporation 
did not charge the members at the same rate. However, 
this is not in accordance with the evidence. It is true that 
counsel for Defendant referred to three different occa-
sions where a specific amount was charged by the Corpo-
ration to a member, but there is no evidence as to the 
amount owing except by innuendo. When asked whether 
a certain sum was the amount of the bid, Mr. Whitaker 
testified that he did not know (R. 97) but that the amount 
charged was to his best judgment, the amount owing on 
the basis of the fee schedule. (R. 50) In one instance he 
said an error may have been made if the amount of the 
bid was as stated by counsel. (R. 94) However, the record 
does not show what the amount of the bid was and there-
fore, we cannot say whether an error was made by the 
computor or not. 
Defendant likewise claims that the Corporation 
''could have, and did, fail to supply Defendant with many 
of the bids.'' This is not in accordance with the evi-
dence. The witness Whitaker testified that the bids were 
either delivered to Danielson personally, or that they 
were mailed to him, except the bids which were furnished 
11 
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to individual members as a matter of personal informa-
tion to them in accordance with the instructions which 
he had from the Board of Directors. (R. 45) Defendant 
never denied that he received the bids which the witness 
for the Plaintiff testified were prepared and mailed to 
the members. In fact, when asked by his counsel as to how 
many estimates he received, Defendant testified he didn't 
know. (R. 128) The most that c~n be said for Defend-
ant's position is that he testified that he told the Board 
of Directors he would not pay the money he owed as long 
as a certain officer handled the funds. The record shows 
that this man was released within a few months after the 
incorporation and thereafter the Defendant proceeded 
to pay his initial subscription and some of the fees owing. 
Unfortunately, he did not pay all that he owed. 
Defendant further attempts to avoid liability in this 
matter on the ground that in addition to the obligation to 
furnish services by way of materials estimates, the Cor-
poration was to invest its surplus funds. The witness 
Whitaker, however, testified : 
'' To make an investment our Board of Direc-
tors felt that we should have a consistent and con-
tinuing income, and eYery time 'Ye found an 
investment that looked good to us, 'Ye figured 'Ye 
had to have money to go into it, and so 've were 
struggling along saYing money.'' (R. 102) 
Perhaps, if this Defendant had paid the amount 
owing by him at the time it 'Yas due and payable, there 
may have been funds available for inYestment. In any 
event, the Corporation would not be required to inYest its 
12 
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funds if it appeared necessary to have them on hand to 
pay its current obligations. 
The fact that there was not sufficient funds to make 
any investments also negatives Defendant's claim that 
the charges were excessive for the services rendered. De-
fendant points to no testimony in the record to the effect 
that any part of the consideration for the fee charged 
by the Corporation was the investment of funds. Obvious-
ly, any oganiza.tion would want to invest any surplus 
funds rather than to leave them idle, but would have to 
have funds before it could invest them. 
PoiNT II 
IS PLAINTIFF PRECLUDED FROM RECOV-
ERY BY REASON OF THE PROVISIONS OF 
SECTION 25-5-4, U. C. A. 1953 (COMMONLY 
REFERRED TO AS THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS)~ 
In presenting the argument that the agreement be-
tween the parties was in violation of Section 25-5-4, 
U. C. A. 1953, in that the agreement was not in writing, 
Defendant actually ignores the provisions of the statute 
which reads as follows : 
''In the following cases, every agreement shall 
be void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith : 
'' 1. Every agreement that by its term.s is not 
to be performed within one year from the making 
thereof.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
13 
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By the very terms of the statute, the agreement must 
specifically provide that it is not to be performed within 
the provisions thereof. Our Court early held in the case 
of Johnson v. Johnson, 31 Utah 408, 88 Pac. 230, that a 
contract by a purchaser of land to pay the seller ''for 
life, one-half of the crops produced on lands'' was not 
within the above provision since death might occur 
within one year. Likewise, the Restatement of Contracts 
in interpreting a similar phrase states the rule to be: 
''The words 'cannot be fully performed' must 
be taken literally. The fact that performance with-
in a year is entirely improbable or not expected 
by the parties, does not bring the contract within 
this statute.'' (Sec. 198, Comment b.) 
In the instant case, the witness Whitaker testified 
that "Any member of the corporation is free to leave 
the corporation ,if he will bring his stock into us and make 
it known that he wants to leave. No one has ever done 
it.'' (R. 103) 
Based upon the foregoing, and other evidence in the 
case, the Court found. that the agreement between the 
parties ''was terminable by either party at any time,'' 
(R. 149) so that there is no basis for Defendant's con-
tention that the contract in question was in violation of 
the Statute of Frauds. 
Even if the contract had been within the Statute 
of Frauds, the corporation Plaintiff would be entitled to 
recover the reasonable value of the services rendered, and 
which the Court found to be in excess of the amount sued 
14 
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for. In the case of Fabian.v. Wasatch Orchard Co., (1912) 
41 Utah 404, 125 Pac. 860, the Court held a contract of 
employment to be within the Statute of Frauds but never-
theless went on to state that the Plaintiff was entitled to 
recover the reasonable value of the services rendered 
prior to the contract being repudiated by the other party. 
A cursory reading of the cases cited by Defendant 
discloses that none of them are applicable, either to the 
facts of this case, or the law of this jurisdiction in respect 
thereto. 
PoiNT III 
IS THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT AGAINST 
PUBLIC POLICY AND IN VIOLATION OF 
SECTION 50-1-6, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, 
AND THEREFORE VOID AND UNENFORCE-
ABLE AS AN UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT OF 
TRADE~ 
The Defendant asserts that the agreement between 
the Plaintiff corporation and its masonry contractor 
stockholders is in violation of public policy and violative 
of Section 50-1-6 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in that 
it is a restraint of trade. 
He thereby raises two basic questions, the first of 
these is whether or not the agreement is violative of 
Utah's Little Sherman Act as contained in Title 50 of the 
Utah Code. Secondly, if it be found that it is not a viola-
tion of Utah's Little Sherman Act, the further question 
arises as to whether it is in violation of a broader concept 
of public policy than is presented by this Statute. 
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It would seem that the best way to dispose of the 
first of these questions -that of the Sherman Act Doc-
trine - would be to refer to the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the cases which it has handed down in 
relation to trade association activities. Perhaps one of 
the outstanding decisions rendered on this problem was 
handed down in the case of Maple Flooring MOJJVUfactur· 
ers Association v. U rvited States (1925) 268 U. S. 563, 45 
S. C. 578. In that case the Maple Flooring Association 
had been enjoined by the district court from continuing 
their activities. These activities consisted of a computa-
tion and distribution among the members of the associa-
tion of the average cost to association members of all di-
mensions and grades of flooring, the compilation and 
distribution among members of a booklet showing freight 
rates, a gathering of statistics showing the quantity and 
kind of flooring sold and the prices received by the re-
cording members, and the amount of stock on hand. The 
Supreme Court in reversing the decree of the district 
court, held that the activities of the association were not 
in restraint of trade : 
, 
''It is the consensus of opinion of economists 
and of many of the most important agencies of 
government that the public interest is served by 
the gathering and dissemination, in the rightist 
possible manner, of information with respect to 
the production and distribution, costs and prices 
in actual sales, of market commodities because the 
making available of such information tends to sta-
bilize trade and industry, to produce fairer price 
levels and to avoid the waste which inevitably at-
tends the unintelligent conduct of econo1nic enter· 
prise. Free competition means a free and open 
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market among both buyers and sellers for the sale 
and distribution of commodities. Competition 
does not become less free merely because the con-
duct of commercial operations becomes more intel-
ligent through the free distribution of knowledge 
of a.ll the essential factors entering into the com-
mercial tra;n.saction. General knowledge that there 
is an accumulation of surplus of any market com-
modity would undoubtedly tend to diminish pro-
duction, but the dissemination of tha.t informa-
tion cannot in itself be said to be restraint upon 
commerce in any legal sense. The manufacturer is 
free to produce, but produce and business fore-
sight based on that knowledge influences free 
choice in favor of more limited production. Re-
straint upon free competition begins w·hen im-
proper use is made of that informa.tion to a;ny con-
serted action of those w·ho buy and sell. 
"It is not the purpose or the intent of the Sher-
ma.n Anti-Trust La;w to inhibit the intelligent 
conduct of busin,ess operation, nor do we conceive 
that its purpose wa-s to supp·ress such influences 
that might affect the op-eration of inter-stale com-
merce through the application to them of the indi-
vidual in.telligence of those en,gaged in commerce, 
enlightened by accura.te information as to the 
essential elements of the economics of a trade or 
business, however gathered or disseminated. Per-
sons who unite in gathering and disseminating in-
formation in trade journals and statistical reports 
on industry, who gather and publish statistics as 
to the amount of production of commodities in 
interstate commerce, and who report market 
prices, are not engaged in unlawful conspiracies 
in restraint of trade merely because the ultimate 
result of their efforts may be to stabilize prices or 
limit production through a better understanding 
of economic laws and a more general ability to 
conform to them, for the simple reason that the 
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Shermarn Law neither repeals economic laws nor 
prohibits the gathering and · dissemination of 
information. Sellers of a;ny com.modity who guide 
the daily conduct of their business on the basis of 
market reports would hardly be deemed to be co~ 
spirator s engaged in restraint of interstate com-
merce. They wDuld not be any more so merely be-
cause they become stockholders in a corporation or 
joint owners of a trade journal, engaged in the 
business of compiling an.d publishing such re-
ports." (Emphasis supplied) 
Certainly the awareness of the Supreme Court as 
to the economics of business conduct should carry greater 
weight than does the apparent lack of understanding ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of 
Master Builders Association of Kansas v. Carson (1931) 
132 Kan. 606, 296 Pac. 693, which is stressed by the De-
fendant in his Brief. The Kansas Court in that case, while 
striking down a contract distinguishable from the present 
one in several factors to be taken up later, used the fol-
lowing language : 
''There cannot be this competition between 
contractors when all of them bidding on a certain 
job derive a large share of their information and 
their pro biding (sic) engineering service from the 
same course. The engineers and other employees 
of the appellant may be ever so successful and 
ever so competent and efficient, but, if all the bid-
ders of a certain job have secured the same service 
of that kind, from where is going to come the com-
petition 1 The spirit of this type of legislation is 
that all bidders will strive in all departments of 
their work to outdo the others that are in the 
same field. This feature of the contracting busi-
ness is just as important to a successful contractor 
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as the business of actually doing the work, and 
the spirit of the statutes is that each one will strive 
to outdo the other by shrewder engineering work, 
by closer observation of local labor conditions, by 
closer figuring on the places from where raw ma-
terials may be obtained, freight rates, and all the 
other myriad problems which enter into the suc-
cessful handling of a bid for any job. Now, if this 
Court should approve a contract such as the one 
sued on here, the public would lose much of the 
benefit to be derived from this competition be-
tween contractors. In fact, about the only thing 
that makes competition between contractors would 
be gone.'' 
The Kansas Court here assumes that it is to the 
benefit to the public that contractors make mistakes in 
bidding. Certainly there is no restraint in trade if all the', 
contractors were to be given the exact figure of X number 
of bricks and X hundred pounds of mortar which it would 
take to erect a building. Anyone who would deprive them 
of this right would say that the public is better off when 
some unsuspecting, perhaps negligent, contractor sub-
mits a bid mistakenly figuring only half the number of 
bricks actually required for the job. Certainly, this is 
not the intent nor purpose of competitive bidding. In 
fact, a review of cases will indicate that if the contractor 
makes a great mistake in this area that he will be re-
lieved from his competitive bid. The recent Utah case 
State v. Union Construction Co. (1959) 9 Utah 107, 339 
P. 2d 421 strongly bears this out. In that case a road 
contractor submitted a bid for road work in the southern 
part of the state. He made a mistake as to the direction 
in which the road would go and so submitted a bid of 
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some $29,000.00 less than it should have been. The State 
of Utah accepted his bid, he refused to carry it out and 
sued the State· to recover the amount of bid bonds he had 
put up. The court in allowing him to recover stated that 
an error such as he made should be excused and he should 
not be held to his contract. 
In view of the doctrine set forth in that case, a group 
of contractors unable to hire individually the type of com-
petent, efficient service needed to ascertain the exact 
amount of materials required for a job are well advised 
to pool their efforts to gain certainty. They can then 
decide individually what they, as an efficient operating 
enterprise with the type of machinery they use, the type 
of men they have working for them, and the amount of 
money they need for overhead, need to perform that job. 
Certainly the presentment to all contractors of the 
exact amount of materials that will go into a job operates 
for the benefit of the public and not to its disadvantage. 
We re-emphasize the Supreme Court's language that 
"comp-etition does not become less free merely because 
the conduct of commercial operations becomes more 
intelligent through the free distribution of knowledge 
of all essential factors entering into the commercial 
trams action.'' 
Where no attempt is made to limit productioll, fix 
prices, or control commodities, contracts are generally 
valid. Certainly the sure knowledge of the amount of 
materials to go into a job does not fix the price nor con-
trol production of the commodity. Therefore, Defend-
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ant's claim that the agreement with Plaintiff Corpora-
tion violates Section 50-1-1, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, 
is not well founded. 
Defendant's second point- that based upon a broad 
general coneept of ''public policy'' - is likewise unten-
able. Perhaps to tie this problem down to somewhat of 
a more concrete situation we might again quote from the 
Supreme Court of the United States: 
''Public policy is to be ascertained by reference 
to the laws and legal precedents and not from gen-
eral consideration of supposed public interest. 
There must be found definite indications in the 
laws of the sovereignty to justify the invalidation 
of a contract as contrary to public policy.'' (Mus-
chany v. U. S., 324 U.S. 49) 
The public policy is to be found in the Constitution 
and laws and decisions of the Courts, and when the Court 
is asked to declare a contract void as being against pub-
lic policy, to justify sustaining the defense, the line of 
that policy must be clear and distinct. United States v. 
Grace Evangelical Church of South Providence Ridge, 
137 F. 2d 460. 
Turning to something a little closer to home in this 
regard we find the Supreme Court of Utah in the case 
of Fra.iley v. McGarry (1949) 116 Utah 504, 211 P. 2d 
840, stating as follows : 
''There ean be no doubt concerning the duty of 
this court to invalidate contracts which have a 
tendency to be injurious to the public welfare ... 
Although the legislature has given formal expres-
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sion to this principle, the principle· would be 
equally true in the absence of statute. While con-
tract obligations in controven.tion of public policy 
may ordina.rily be avoided by the contracting p·ar· 
ties, the law favors the right of men of full age and 
competent understanding to contract freely and 
before this right is denied on. the grounds of pub· 
lie policy, there must be a showing free from doubt 
tha.t the contra.ct is against public policy and not 
merely one which has turned out unfortunately 
for one pa.rty or one that was imprudently made. 
If by any reasonable construction the contract coo 
be declared lawful and not in contravention of pub-
lic policy, it is our duty to so interpret it." (Em-
phasis supplied) 
In support of the claim that the agreement is against 
public policy, Plaintiff relies upon the general statements 
appearing in Williston on Contracts and the Restatement 
of the Law, Contracts. The same principle is enunciated 
by both authorities to the effect that ''a bargain not to 
bid a.t an auction, or any public competion, having as its 
p·rimary object to stifle competition, is illegal.'' (Restate-
ment of the Law, Con.tracts, Vol. 2, Sec. 517. See also, 
Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Vol. 5, Sec. 
1663). 
We desire to point out to the Court the basic require-
ment that the primary object must be to stifle competi-
tion. We have carefully reviewed and analyzed the above 
statements and the cases cited by Defendant which pur-
port to apply this principle of la": to situations such as 
are now before the Court. Let us start 'vith the illustra-
tion given by the Restatement that "'"here "A, B, C, and 
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D, building contractors, -~rgu~. with another to form the 
X association and that in future bids for the award of 
building contracts the successful bidder shall pay to the 
X association 2 per cent of the gross amount of the price 
fixed in the contract awarded'' the agreement is void. 
In this illustration the only object of the agreement 
would be to stifle competition by sharing with each other 
the fruits of the successful bid. However, that is not 
the situation before this Court in the instant matter 
where the purpose of the fee is to pay for the services 
being rendered to the individual by the Corporation. 
That this is a valid distinction is aptly demonstrated 
by the Court's comments in the case of Associated W is-
consin Contractors v. Lathers, 235 Wis. 14, 291 N.W. 
770, cited by Defendant on page 16 of his brief. The 
Court stated there was "no allegation of facts that take 
the case out from under the rule.'' There no services 
were rendered but a mere ''pool'' of money was created 
for the members. Such also was the situation in the case 
of lJ!la.ster Builders Association of Kansas v. Carson, 
supra. In that case the fee was in fact a ''kick back,'' 
one-half of which went to the next five low bidders and 
the balance into the association ''pool.'' The Court there 
found that the effect of the agreement would ''naturally 
result in an increase in the costs of the school building." 
No one can deny the logic of the conclusion reached 
by the Court under the facts in that case. However, the 
case overlooks the basic and controlling fact that if the 
contractor receives a service and benefit from the infor-
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mation furnished him, in adding this amount to his bid 
he is doing nothing different from what literally hundreds 
upon thousands of contractors do in submitting any bid. 
Submitting an estimate of what they feel it will cost them 
to do the job plus what they figure is a fair profit. If they 
have contracted to buy materials from ''X'' Company for 
$2,000.00 and have contracted to pay for information re-
ceived, which information was applied and used in the 
figuring of that job, both must be added into the price bid 
for the contract. But in both instances the amount added 
to the contract is for a necessary and justifiable expense 
entered into for the purpose of fulfilling the obligation of 
the contract. 
The case of Constructors Association v. Seeds (1949), 
142 Pa. Sup. 59, 15 A. 2d 467, also relied on by Defend-
ant, discusses all of the cases cited in his Brief and points 
out the factors which obviously induced the courts in 
those cases to hold the several contracts void as against 
public policy. In the Constructors Association Case, the 
by-laws of the Association provided that each member 
should pay to the Association a certain percentage of each 
contract secured. ''This percentage, one-half of one per 
cent, shall be included in any estimates for ne\Y work 
taken ... '' No provision was made for any services and 
no services were rendered by the Association for 
such dues. These were merely dues to belong to the 
organization. 
The court pointed out that the same situation pre-
vailed in the case of Ken.tucky Association v. TTTilliams, 
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213 Ky 167, 280 S.W. 937, and the Master Builders Asso-
ciation Case, supra, relied upon by Defendant. After dis-
cussing these cases and the rule enunciated in the Restate·-
ment of the La.w, Contracts, Sec. 517, the court, as the 
basis for determining the contract to be against public 
policy, concluded: 
''It seems quite apparent that such a by-law 
has a direct tendency to injure the public and 
thus affect competitive bidding. The percentage 
charged all members is obviously not a pa.yment in 
the form of dues for services rendered by the asso·-
ciation, but gives to such members an interest in 
the contract as it results in making a distribution 
to them through the association of a portion of 
the contract price.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
In the instant case the facts establish, and the lower 
Court found, that the services rendered by the Plain-
tiff Corporation were substantially greater in value than 
what Defendant is required to pay. 
Defendant argues that the cost of this service must 
be added to the bid submitted by a contractor. Obviously, 
any cost of operation must be absorbed by the contractor 
out of the moneys received by him for the work done or 
the contractor would go broke. If the contractor pays for 
10 or 15 estimates without being successful in either of 
such bids, he will have to add the cost thereof to the next 
bid or bids in order to break even. Every bid must 
contain a sufficient margin to allow for contingencies, 
overhead costs when no work is being performed, taxes, 
accounting, insurance, legal expense, and a reasonable 
profit to the contractor. However, if the bid is not low 
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enough to be competitive with other contractors - who 
are not members ·of the Plaintiff Corporation (and we 
must keep in mind that there are less than 15 masonry 
contractors who belong to Plaintiff Corporation out of 
perhaps a hundred or more licensed in this state) some 
other contractor will walk off with the contract. 
Defendant did not produce any evidence at the trial 
which would show or . tend to show either ( 1) that the 
charges made for the services rendered were dispropor-
tionate or excessive; or ( 2) that the effect of the agree-
ment would be to increase cost of construction in the 
industry or stifle competition. 
Surely, these small masonry contractors may band 
together to save costs and expenses by jointly hiring an 
estimator and a computet without being subject to the 
claim that such has as its p·rimary object the stifling of 
competition or the increasing of the cost of construction. 
Many large general contracting firms may have sufficient 
business to hire a full-time estimator or pay a ''retainer'' 
to a professional person. Is it any greater sin for a num-
ber of small sub-contractors such as masonry workers to 
share the cost of such service and pay on a contingent 
basis - that is only when such sub-contractor receives a 
job out of which he will have income with which to pay his 
bills~ 
It is also of interest to note that in the Constructors 
Associ.ation Case, supra, the Court ruled that the by-law 
in question ''constitutes the agreement between the Asso-
ciation and its members and is subject to the same rules 
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of construction as a written contract signed by all the 
parties.'' 
The court further held : 
"Like all by-laws it shall be deemed legal 
unless manifestly it tends to injure the public in 
some way.'' 
While there has been services rendered by the cor-
porate organization or entity as a basis for the fees or 
assessments levied against the members, the courts have 
been uniform in holding that the contract or agreement 
to pay such fees or charges is not against public policy. 
See, Electrical Con-tractors Associa.tion of the City of 
Chicago v. A. S. Schrulma;n Electric Company, (1945) 324 
Ill. App. 28, 57 N.E. 2d 320; aff'd. 391 Ill. 333, 63 N.E. 
2d 392, and annotated in 161 A.L.R. 787. The court in 
that case held that where services rendered by an asso-
ciation of electrical contractors to its members are legal 
in their purpose and intent the mere fact that a by-law 
affixed the dues of a member upon a sliding scale propor-
tionate to the amount of business done by the members 
would not make that by-law pertaining to the dues vio-
lative of public policy on the theory that such arrange-
ment gave each member an interest in business of the 
other members or as tending to suppress competition. 
The A.L.R. annotation on that case considers both sides 
of the question as to whether this type of an association 
contract should be declared violative of public policy. 
161 A.L.R. 787. 
In Griffiths & Sprague Stevedore Co. v. Waterfront 
Emp. Ass'n of Pacific Coast (C. A. 9) 162 Fed. 2d 1017, 
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the Court of Appeals expressly rejected the holding of 
the Kansas Court in the Carson Case, supra. In the 
Griffiths & Sp·rague Stevedore Co. Case, the Appellee 
brought an action against Appellant to collect the sum of 
$74,471.04 owing as "dues" for the years 1943 and 1944. 
The evidence showed that Appellant had paid the dues 
for the two preceding years without question. The dues 
against member organizations were assessed on the basis 
of 2Y2 cents per ton on all offshore and intercoastal cargo 
harndled by each member, payable at the end of each 
month. 
In affirming the decision of the trial court which 
granted judgment to the Association, the Court of 
Appeals stated: 
''Appellant contends that 'Appellee's claim is 
contrary to public policy and therefore void.' 
Appellee's claim is for the unpaid assessments 
mentioned above. These assessments were levied 
by the resolution mentioned above. Assessments 
levied by the resolution were levied to cover the 
cost of services performed by appellee for its 
members. Services so performed by appellee w·ere 
needed by its members in handling offshore and 
intercoastal cargo, including Ar1ny cargo." (Em-
phasis added) 
In the instant matter, it is the belief of the Plaintiff 
that the contract was entered into for the purpose of 
gaining a very necessary and vital element \vhich would 
enter into the bidding for masonry contracts. The infor-
mation ,gained through Plaintiff Corporation enabled 
the contractors to be more assured of the correctness of 
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their bid. The amount paid for this service is actually 
somewhat nominal in effect and enables the contractor 
to proceed with confidence and assuredness that his bid 
includes an accurate computation of the actual amount 
of material which will go into the job. It enables him to 
actually lower his bid because he need not add any per-
centage for risk calculation. 
The comment contained in the annotation in 161 
A.L.R. appears particularly appropriate. We quote: 
"It is submitted that when a court holds, as 
a matter of law and without supporting evidence, 
that the payment of dues proportioned to business 
done has a tendency to raise prices, it ignores the 
facts. It ignores the probability that the associa-
tion gives the dues-payer his money's worth, and 
that it can perform services which actually result 
in reduced prices to the public. It assumes that 
businessmen are so stupid that they spend 
$70,000,000 a year for association dues without 
receiving corresponding benefits. 
''Let us assume the common case where one 
hundred or more manufacturers or other busi-
nessmen in the same field must sell on credit. If 
there is no central credit agency, each manufac-
turer must obtain his own information independ-
ently; but if there is an association which main-
tains a central credit agency the manufacturers 
may reduce the expense of one hundred credit 
departments. The dues paid for such a service 
would not ordinarily equal the expense to the indi-
vidual of maintaining his own investigation serv-
ice. And the central agency might be so much 
more efficient than his own service that it would 
enable him to avoid credit risks which his own 
limited facilities would not detect. There is noth-
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ing in such a reduction of expenses and losses 
which woul4 increase prices to the public.'' 
Def~ndant attempts to distinguish the above ·cases 
relied upon by Plaintiff by stating that those cases in-
volved "non-profit" organizations. We cannot see how 
the form of the corporate entity makes any difference. 
In either event the members own the assets of the organi-
zation and upon liquidation are paid whatever reserves 
or surpluses are accumulated. In fact, during the time 
the organization continues to exist, if a sufficient undi-
vided surplus is accumulated,_ it may be paid out in the 
form of dividends to stockholders or members in either 
case or it may be used up by reducing the fees or charges 
made. 
The intent and _purpose of the corporate entity is to 
be determined from the purposes declared in the Articles 
regardless of the 'form; and in the present instance the 
Articles specifically provide that the purpose for which 
the corporation was formed was first "to provide a serv-
ice business for the masonry contractors.'' 
Defendant claims there are three conditions which 
result from the agreement involved here and which were 
present in the Master Builders Association Case, supra: 
( 1) The contractor is likely to add the costs of the 
service to the contract. The Court ''Till note that Defend-
ant concedes that it is a cost of service 'vith 'vhich we are 
here involved. In the cases relied on by Defendant there 
were no serv~ces rendered for the alleged dues. Also, 
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the cost of all services rendered to a contractor in his 
business must be added in somewhere in his bid or he will 
not be able to break even in his business. 
(2) Those who did not give any service would benefit 
in the winning contractor's business. In the Kansas Case 
each of the next 5 lowest bidders received a share of the 
successful bidder's bid. This was and is against public 
policy. But in the instant case only the ·corporation re-
ceives anything from the successful bidder and this is in 
payment of the services being continuously rendered by 
the corporation. No individual member or stockholder 
profits in any way except that all receive the same serv-
ice and some may pay more than others because of having 
more business. It is a little like saying that an unsuc-
cessful litigant whose attorney represents him on a con-
tingent basis shares in the recovery of a successful liti-
gant because the latter apparently pays the fees of the 
attorney while the former does not. Nevertheless such a 
contract is not against public policy and void. 
( 3) The service ''would be an exceptionally high 
priced source.'' Defendant refers to the deposition of Mr. 
Whitaker on this point as well as elsewhere in his Brief. 
It must be remembered that the deposition was never read 
in court and is not a part of the record on appeal. How-
ever, the references to the testimony are not accurate. 
The witness Whitaker testified that a reasonable cost of 
giving each of the estimates to Defendant would have 
been between $40.00 to $50.00 where the estimates were 
being distributed on a volume basis. (R. 89) Since De-
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fendant received in excess of 250 of these estimates during 
the period he was active the reasonable cost to him of such 
service was in excess of $7,500.00. The Court actually 
found the reasonable value of the service to be not more 
than $7,000.00. (Finding No. 6, R. 149) 
We again emphasize, as did the Court in the Circuit 
Court in the Griffiths & Sprague Stevedore Co. Case, 
supra, that any member could withdraw whenever he 
chose to do so and save himself the cost of the services if 
he felt they were not adequate or the cost therefor was 
excessive. Defendant in this case did cease to be active; 
and although he did not formally resign the Plaintiff Cor-
poration cancelled any obligation to pay for the services 
thereafter rendered to him even though it had no notice 
of his resignation. 
SUMMARY 
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that the Find-
ings of the lower court in this case are amply supported 
by the evidence and that under the facts the agreement 
of the Defendant to pay for the services rendered to him 
by the Plaintiff Corporation does not have as its pri-
mary object the stifling of competition or the increasing 
of the cost of construction and is therefore not illegal 
as a restraint of trade. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
NIELSEN AND CONDER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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